Using a novel dataset drawn from investment conferences from 2008 to 2013, I show that hedge funds take advantage of the publicity of these conferences to strategically release their book information to drive market demand. Specifically, hedge funds sell pitched stocks after the conferences to take profit and create room for better investment opportunities. However, the pitched stocks still perform better than non-pitched stocks in the funds' portfolios afterwards. Hedge funds do not pitch obviously bad stocks because maintaining a good reputation helps them raise money. Pitched stocks earn a cumulative abnormal return of 20% over 18 months before the pitch and continue to outperform the benchmark by 7% over 9 months afterwards. Post-conference abnormal return reverts partially after another 9 months. Moreover, mutual funds exhibit opposite trading behaviors-selling before the pitches and buying afterwards-and may contribute to the post-pitch outperformance. Other hedge funds trade pitched stocks similarly to the funds that pitch them, suggesting that they either run correlated strategies or share information with each other.
Introduction
Hedge funds are usually associated with secrecy and are not known for sharing their investment ideas for free. However, since 2008, a new type of industry event-investment conferences-has become popular and emerged as a hallmark event in the investment management industry. At these conferences, prominent hedge fund managers such as David Einhorn from Greenlight and David
Tepper from Appaloosa pitch their investment ideas externally to the audiences. They take place throughout the year at various locations and are usually open to anyone who registers and purchases a ticket. 1 Most of these conferences are organized by non-profit organizations, foundations and industry associations benefit charitable causes. They are well attended by a broad range of financial institutions, including activists, fundamental equity funds, investment advisors and sell-side research analysts. Together, the speakers and the attendees represent a sizeable portion of the capital market.
Furthermore, the investment ideas presented at these conferences are closely followed in the financial media and on investment blogs. As a result, these stock pitches are market-moving events. During the first two days of the pitches, long pitches outperform the market by 1.1% whereas short pitches underperform by more than 2% and their trading volumes spike up.
In this paper, I hand-collect a novel dataset on investment ideas pitched at these investment conferences and document this new industry phenomenon. Specifically, I evaluate the performances of these investment ideas and analyze the holdings patterns of the hedge funds that pitch them. I show that pitched stocks generally have positive risk-adjusted returns both before and after the pitches. However, the funds that pitch sell their pitched stock after the conferences. In addition, I analyze how other investors react to these investment pitches and find wide heterogeneity in behavior between hedge funds and mutual funds.
There is an increasing need to understand hedge funds' behaviors and their implications for market e ciency. Albeit still small compared to the mutual fund industry, the hedge fund industry has grown tremendously over the past two decades. The assets under management have grown from less than $50 billion in 1990 to more than $1 trillion in 2006. Their behaviors are also closely followed on the news and often make headlines because they frequently take speculative bets and 1 Example investment conferences include Sohn New York, Sohn San Francisco, Value Investing Congress, Great Investors' Best Ideas, and Excellence in Investing. Please see Section A for a description of the Sohn Investment Conference from its website, its registration page and the price schedule play an important role in the price discovery process. One important type of behavior is disclosure behavior-how hedge funds release their book information and investment strategies to the public, either mandatorily or voluntarily. For instance, hedge funds meeting certain criteria are required by regulation to disclose their portfolios through SEC 13F and 13D filings. Hedge fund mangers sometimes also voluntarily speak on TV to advocate their recent investment theses. They are likely to exhibit di erent disclosure behaviors at di erent stages of investment.
The investment conference is a unique voluntary disclosure channel compared to others channels for three important reasons. First, these conferences are highly-coordinated events and attract significant attention in the investment management industry, as described earlier. A wide variety of market participants are present at the same time. Stock pitches at the conferences receive high levels of attention in the financial news. Second, hedge funds managers who pitch investment ideas have the attention of the audience throughout their speeches. They can take time to walk through their investment theses with control and flexibility. They can be more persuasive in person than they ca be on TV or in other venues. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some audience members even begin trading the pitched stocks in the middle of the presentations. 2 Third, it is easier for an investor to gauge general interest in pitched stocks based on soft information when interacting with other investors in person at these conferences.
Due to these unique features, investment conferences give hedge fund managers strong incentives to disclose their "best ideas" strategically and to use these conferences as a new tactic to manage their portfolio positions. Unlike mandatory regulatory filings, voluntary disclosures like stock pitches at conferences are often driven by private motivations, and the funds face complex incentives. On one hand, hedge funds have incentives to pitch bad stocks. Knowing that their disclosure can attract more investors, they may want to use investment conferences to create their own liquidity events for the stocks they want to liquidate. An increase in demand for a stock can push up its price in the short-term (Greenwood 2005) . If they see that a stock in their portfolios is going to underperform, they can disclose these positions publicly to induce favorable short-term price pressure. However, doing so damages their reputation over the long run and is not a sustainable strategy in a repeated game.
2
David Einhorn mentions in the book Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, A Long Short Story that some audience members left during a presentation to either sell the short pitch or tell their clients to sell.
On the other hand, hedge funds have incentives to pitch good stocks. Young hedge funds can use these events to build a reputation for their investment skills and attract capital from future LP investors. For instance, David Einhorn from Greenlight Capital pitched short Lehman Brothers at the Value Investing Congress in 2007 and gained significant acknowledgment. Moreover, hedge funds-especially activists and short sellers-can use these events to advocate their investment thesis and improve their returns. Due to limits to arbitrage, they often cannot correct mispricings themselves (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) , especially short sellers. As a result, they often publicly disclose their investment ideas to "recruit" more followers to facilitate price discovery (Ljungqvist and Qian 2016) . They publish detailed research reports online and talk about their investment theses in public. Activists, in particular, need shareholders' votes to implement the strategic plans they propose. For instance, Bill Ackman from Pershing Square pitched long JC Penny at the Sohn Conference in New York in 2012 to further advocate his proposed turnaround strategy.
To understand the motives of hedge funds, I collect stock pitches at investment conferences from various online sources. I apply textual analysis techniques to extract fund names and stock tickers and merge them to returns and 13F holdings. First, I ask whether stocks pitched at investment conferences do in fact outperform. I conduct event studies around these stock pitches and calculate risk-adjusted returns using Fama-French 3 factors with momentum and DGTW stock characteristics.
I find that pitched stocks outperform after the pitches. A calendar-time strategy that buys pitched stocks and sells non-pitched stocks generates an annualized return of 8.2% and has an annualized Sharpe ratio of 0.67. However, the risk-adjusted return of pitched stocks is much smaller after the pitches than before the pitches. Pitched stocks earn a cumulative risk-adjusted return of 20% over the 18 months before the pitch and 7% over the 9 months after the pitch. Furthermore, half the post-conference risk-adjusted returns revert after another 9 months.
Using the 13F holdings and Form D filings, I investigate whether the hedge funds hold onto their pitched stocks and their motives for doing so. Contrary to their claims, I find that they do not hold onto their pitched stocks any longer than to non-pitched stocks after the conferences although the pitched stocks do outperform. They tend to pitch stocks in which they have larger papers and want to take profit. These pitched stocks do not have to be bad stocks. They can simply be stocks that are not as attractive as other potential ideas in the hedge funds' investment opportunity set. Newly bought stocks outperform the pitched stocks that the funds sell after the conferences. Moreover, I
find that stock pitches at investment conferences help hedge funds raise money. Therefore, they have strong incentives not to pitch obviously bad stocks.
Finally, I turn to the behaviors of other investors. There can be multiple possible responses to these pitches. On one hand, unsophisticated investors may naively follow what sophisticated investors pitch as a good investment idea. As a result, even sophisticated investors may also follow these pitches due to rational herding. On the other hand, if other investors know that these hedge funds are not genuinely sharing their best ideas, they may not want to follow these pitches.
Furthermore, the holdings of the prominent hedge funds are usually available from 13F filings albeit with a time lag. To provide evidence on possible heterogeneity in investor behaviors, I separate active 13F institution investors from passive ones and categorize them into hedge funds, mutual funds and investment advisors. I show that although they all follow the pitches in the short term, they exhibit quite di erent trading behaviors around these investment conferences. Specifically, hedge funds and mutual funds trade in opposite ways. Other hedge funds show trading patterns very similar to those of the hedge funds that are pitching stocks. This suggests that they either run correlated strategies or share information with each other. However, mutual funds sell before the pitches and buy afterwards. The subsequent buying pressure from mutual funds and investment advisers is a possible causes of the positive excess return after the pitches, even when the hedge funds are selling the pitched stocks. An alternative hypothesis is that mutual funds are passive liquidity providers. However, the positive return after the pitches is also harder to reconcile if there is selling pressure only from the hedge funds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates my paper to the current literature on fund performance and the strategic behaviors of investment management firms. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the methodology and presents empirical results on the performances of investment pitches. Section 5 analyzes the trading behaviors of di erent investors using 13F holdings and explores their motives. Section 6 concludes.
Related Literature
This paper first adds to the extensive literature on the performance of active money management.
On one hand, current studies find insignificant excess return among professional fund managers. Jensen (1968) documents that mutual funds do not outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy under CAPM. Other papers corroborate this finding with similar results (Carhart 1997 , Grinblatt and Titman 1989 , 1993 . Gruber (1996) explains why investors still invest in mutual funds even if their performance has been inferior to that of index funds. On the other hand, other papers find that mutual funds exhibit some stock selection ability using stock-characteristic-based benchmarks but that their net returns underperform , Wermers 2000 . More recently, numerous papers find strong evidence for stock-level selective skills among high-conviction and concentrated active holdings (Kacperczyk et al. 2005 , Alexander et al. 2007 , Cremers and Petajisto 2009 , Pomorski 2009 , Cohen et al. 2010 , Agarwal et al. 2013a , Rhinesmith 2014 . These "best" ideas generate positive alpha, suggesting that fund managers exhibit meaningful stock-picking skills. This inconsistence can be reconciled by the fact that fund managers have incentives to add stocks with little conviction to their portfolios (Berk and Green 2004, Cohen et al. 2010 ). These stocks can diversify portfolio risk, reduce the chance of lagging behind benchmarks and their peers, provide liquidity for redemptions and increase the fund's capacity to charge management fees. This paper also helps illuminate the strategic behaviors of investment managers and how the market processes their information content, in particular portfolio disclosure. Fund managers disclose information on their portfolios. These disclosures can have implications for other market participants. For instance, 13F filings are closely followed by investors and initial disclosures of new investments by notable hedge funds often lead to significant trading and price movements. Frank et al. (2004) , Verbeek and Wang (2013) and Wermers et al. (2010) examine the investment values of these public portfolio disclosures. Furthermore, portfolio disclosure influences how funds operate and invest (Musto 1997 , 1999 , Wermers 2000 , Parida and Teo 2018 , Ge and Zheng 2006 . Other strategic behaviors are also exhibited by investment managers. For instance, Gervais and Strobl (2015) analyze the optimal signal strategies based on managers' skill level and model the dynamics of the pooling and separating equilibrium. Pension funds "window dress" their portfolios to impress sponsors (Lakonishok et al. 2004 ).
While the majority of previous research focuses on mutual funds because of their size and data availability, this paper specifically contributes to the emerging literature on the hedge fund industry and its strategic behaviors. Stulz (2007) gives an overview of research on the hedge fund industry. Fung and Hsieh (1997) , Gri n and Xu (2009) and Bali et al. (2007) find that hedge funds' returns are di erent from those of mutual funds and attempt to identify the determinants of hedge fund performance. More recently, some papers focus on strategic behaviors specific to hedge funds and the strategies they employ. Agarwal et al. (2013b) find that hedge funds conceal their key holdings through confidential 13F filings. Brav et al. (2015) provides a literature review on hedge fund activism. Activists usually use public disclosure as a tactics to promote their investment theses. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , Chen et al. (2008) , Gri n and Xu (2009) and Aragon and Strahan (2012) look at whether hedge funds take or provide liquidity to the market. Chen et al. (2008) and Gri n and Xu (2009) analyze the relationship between hedge funds and mutual funds in particular, and provide evidence that hedge funds profit from mutual fund distresses.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on institutional constraint and behavioral bias among asset managers. Shleifer (1986) , Greenwood (2005) and Greenwood (2008) document the downward-sloping demand curve in the capital market due to limits to arbitrage. Institutional investors can be subject to herding behavior (Scharfstein and Stein 1990) . Cohen et al. (2002) and Frazzini (2006) find that institutional investors under-react to news. Frazzini (2006) finds that mutual funds are also subject to the disposition e ect as retail investors. Table 1 reports the number of conferences, funds and pitches by year.
One limitation of the short time period is that I can assess stock performance only in an upward market. Investment conferences usually happen in late spring or early fall. At each conference, about eight hedge fund managers pitch specific stocks and others talk about macro views and investment philosophies. Although a few funds pitched multiple times in the sample, they pitched di erent stocks at di erent times and most of the pitches have unique stocks.
[ Table 1 about here.] Table 2 reports summary statistics on the pitched stocks and the hedge funds that pitched at investment conferences. The average size of the hedge funds that pitch stocks at conferences is $15.7 billion. On average, they hold 109 names and have existed for 12.8 years. Close to 80% of them are hedge funds and most are located in the New York and Greenwich, CT areas. Note that the size of a fund's 13F holdings does not represent its true assets managements because its book can be levered multiple times and some holdings, such as confidential filings or non-equity positions, might not be reported. Pitched stocks in general are larger than non-pitched stocks and have higher valuation multiples. The appendix provides more detailed information on these conferences and funds. Table   B .1 provides a list of the collected investment conferences. Section A provides a description of one conference and Figure A .1 displays a screenshot of its registration page. Table B .2 provides detailed information for a selected list of the hedge funds that pitched most frequently at these investment conferences.
[ Table 2 about here.] I obtain stock returns from CRSP and company fundamental data from Compustat. I focus on common stocks with share codes 10 and 11 in CRSP. I match them to the stock pitch data based on the point-in-time stock ticker and the pitch date. To calculate the risk-adjusted return, I obtain the Fama-French factors and momentum returns from Ken French's website and the DGTW returns from Russ Wermers' website. I also extend the DGTW returns for the post-2013 period based on the procedure in .
I then link the investment pitches to Thomson Reuters institution holdings database on WRDS.
The stock holdings data is based on publicly available 13F forms. Investment managers with over $100 million under management are required to file 13F with the SEC on a quarterly basis. To link hedge funds at investment conferences to the stock holdings data, I apply a fuzzy string match algorithm to the fund names based on Levenshtein distance and manually validate the matches. I focus on hedge funds' long pitches and long books because funds are only required to report long positions in 13Fs, and short pitches are relatively rare, numbering about 20 in my sample. I then filter for hedge funds running concentrated portfolios with numbers of holdings between 10 and 100.
I assume that the disclosed stock holdings are representative of the long side of a hedge fund's portfolio. The 13F holdings are not necessarily the entire long portfolio of the manager, for various reasons. Certain asset classes are not required to disclose, such as fixed income securities, cash holdings and non-US equities. Small holdings-under 10,000 shares or $200,000-need not disclose.
Investment managers can also request confidential filings (Agarwal et al. 2013b) . Therefore, I exclude from the sample funds whose filings are clearly not representative of their investment strategies or whose strategies are not primarily based on stock-picking. The resulting hypothetical long portfolio represents hedge funds' beliefs and convictions about the underlying stock positions and their investment universe.
To categorize shareholder ownership for a company, I use the FactSet Ownership dataset (LionShares) through WRDS. The dataset provides institutional ownership statistics by firm and the methodology is based on Ferreira and Matos (2008) . Aggregate stock ownership is based on institutional categories such as banks, mutual funds and hedge funds. Table 3 reports summary statistics on stock ownership by investor category for the pitched stocks.
[ Table 3 about here.]
To measure fund raising activities, I collect SEC Form D filings. They cover fund raising through security o erings by both pooled investment funds and startups. I match funds based on phone numbers and entity names, including registered o shore funding vehicles. Hedge funds may use more than one funding vehicles to raise money and they may use di erent names for the funding vehicles. However, they use the same o ce phone number on these forms because they are the primary issuers. Some data matching issues arise if a fund uses a third-party Cayman entity to raise money. They sometimes provide services to more than one fund client and have di erent phone numbers. In this case, I require name matches and discard the rest. 
Stock Pitch Performances
In this section, I conduct event studies on investment pitches and test whether the pitched stocks outperform market and non-pitched stocks. On one hand, funds have an incentive to pitch good stocks. First, they want to use investment conferences to build a good reputation that will help attract future investments. Second, they want to convince investors and correct mispricings that they themselves cannot correct through arbitrages. On the other hand, funds also have incentives to pitch bad stocks. They want create liquidity events and favorable temporary price pressure for positions they want to exit. I first describe the event study methodology and then present empirical results on the short-term market reaction to the stock pitches and their long-term risk-adjusted performances.
Event Study Methodology
To analyze stock pitch performances, I conduct event studies on stock pitches using a methodology similar to that of Binder (1998) and MacKinlay (1997) . I define the pitch date as t = 0 in event time; the time unit can be a trading day, month or quarter. For instance, if the time unit is a day, t = ≠5 means 5 days before the pitch and t = 3 means 3 days after the pitch. To calculate a stock's cumulative return (CR), I sum up its daily returns:
where t is the event time, t = 0 is the pitch date, and R i· is the raw return of stock i at event time
· . This variable is normalized relative to the end of the trading day before the pitch and is equal to 0 at t = ≠1 by construction. The cumulative return before the pitch has a negative sign such that the whole return curve has a consistent direction. When analyzing the returns of a group of stocks, I take the equal-weighted average daily return and then sum them up using the same method.
I calculate the market-adjusted return as the excess return of a stock over the CRSP market benchmark. I calculate the risk-adjusted abnormal return (AR) using Fama-French 3 factors with momentum and DGTW stock characteristics. To calculate the 4-factor alpha, I run the following time series factor regression:
To calculate the DGTW-adjusted return, I assign a stock to one of the 5x5x5 DGTW portfolios based on size, value and momentum and then subtract the portfolio's benchmark return:
where s it , v it and m it indicate stock i's DGTW portfolio assignment based on size, value and momentum, respectively, and BR t (s, v, m) is the benchmark return for the DGTW (s, v, m) portfolio.
To calculate the cumulative risk-adjusted return of a group of stocks, I first take the equal-weighted average of their daily risk-adjusted returns, sum them up and normalize the cumulative return relative to t = ≠1, similar to the calculation of the cumulative raw return.
Short-Term Market Reaction
To understand how the market reacts to the stock pitches, I look at the returns and trading volumes of the pitched stocks in a 10-day event window around the investment conferences. I compare the returns of pitched stocks to the returns of non-pitched stocks and the market. The non-pitched stocks are from the 13F holdings for the same quarter as the investment conferences. Figure 1 plots the cumulative daily returns around investment pitches. The market immediately reacts to the initial disclosure of the stock pitches. The returns of the pitched stocks diverge from the market immediately after the pitches-long pitches spike up and short pitches spike down. In contrast, the non-pitched stocks closely track the market throughout the event window. Furthermore, the return spread does not revert afterwards within the event window. Although it is not necessarily tradable, one can earn about 1% during the first two days after the pitches (including the pitch date)
by buying long pitches and selling either non-pitched stocks or the market and about 2% by doing the opposite trade for short pitches. These results suggest that these investment conferences are closely followed by other investors and have high market impacts. Table 4 shows that there is a statistically and economically significant di erence in returns between pitched stocks and non-pitched stocks.
[ Figure 1 about here.] Figure 2 plots the average daily trading volumes of pitched stocks-both long and short pitchesaround investment conferences. The trading volumes increase during the investment conference and stay heightened for another two days. This is in line with the return patterns. The increase in trading volume before investment conferences suggests that there might have been some information leakage about which stock might be pitched before the conferences. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that many investors speculate on these stock pitches.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
Long-Term Risk-Adjusted Returns
To analyze the risk-adjusted performances of pitched stocks in the long run, I widen the event window to two years and use various risk models to adjust the raw returns in event studies. Figure   3 plots the cumulative market-adjusted returns. Long pitches and non-pitched stocks outperform the market both before and after the conferences, whereas short pitches underperform the market after the conferences. The outperformance is larger for long pitches than for non-pitched stocks.
Because short pitches are few and 13F holdings do not cover short positions, I focus only on long pitches in the subsequent analyses and sections. Figure 4 plots the cumulative adjusted returns using common risk factors. Panel (a) adjusts the returns using Fama-French 3 factors plus momentum and Panel (b) the adjusts returns using DGTW stock characteristics. The results using common risk factors are broadly consistent with the results using the market-adjusted model-the pitched stocks tend to have larger outperformance than the non-pitched stocks. They further show that after controlling for common risk factors, the outperformance of pitched stocks is larger before the conferences than after the conferences.
Furthermore, the outperformance of the pitched stocks becomes quite close to that of the non-pitched stocks and widens again after the conferences. However, after the conferences, the outperformance plateaus after another 9 months and even reverts slightly.
[ To formally test the di erence in returns, I regress the cumulative return on a dummy variable indicating whether a stock holding is pitched at a conference:
where R ij,taet+k is stock i's cumulative return between the month of the pitch t and month t + k, IsP itched ijt indicates whether stock i is pitched by fund j, and ÷ t is time fixed e ects. I cluster standard errors by time to account for the correlation between stocks from the same conference. Table 4 reports the results for market-adjusted returns and Table 5 the results for risk-adjusted returns.
[ Table 4 about here.]
[ Factor regressions show that both have a market beta slightly above 1 and load positively on value and negatively on momentum. Moreover, pitched stocks have higher risk-adjusted returns than non-pitched stocks before the conferences.
[ Table 6 about here.]
A calendar-time portfolio that buys pitched stocks and sells non-pitched stocks produces economically significant alpha. Each position is held from 1 day after the pitch to 100 days after the pitch. When a stock is dropped or added, I rescale the remaining stocks such that they are equal-weighted and the portfolios weights sum to 100%. Figure 5 plots the simulated returns series of the calendar-time portfolios. During the backtest period from 2008 to 2014, the annualized average return is 14.2% for pitched stocks, 7.5% for non-pitched stocks and 6.7% for the long-short portfolio, and the annualized Sharpe ratio is 0.67. Table 7 reports the results of the Jensen's alpha test for the calendar-time portfolios and shows that the pitched stocks and the long-short portfolio have statistically significant positive risk-adjusted returns.
[ Figure 5 about here.]
[ 
Investor Behaviors
This section presents empirical results on investors' trading behavior around stock pitches at investment conferences. First, I investigate the trading behaviors of the funds that pitch stocks based on 13F filings. I then investigate the trade-o s the funds face when choosing which stock to pitch at a conference. Specifically, I test profit-taking, investment opportunities and fund raising incentives and find them to be consistent with the selling behavior. Finally, I investigate the trading behaviors of other investors to further understand how di erent investors react to pitched stocks and provide suggestive evidence on how their behaviors could contribute to the return patterns after the pitches.
Holdings by Funds That Pitched Stocks
If a pitched stock is a fund manger's true "best idea," he can be expected to hold onto it for an extended period of time after the pitch at an investment conference. If he does not, this suggests that he might face other incentives not to pitch his "best idea." To answer the question of whether the fund manager truly believe the pitched stock is his "best idea," I examine the funds' 13F holdings before and after the pitches and reconstruct their hypothetical portfolios. I test whether the funds decrease their holdings of the pitched stocks after the conferences.
To track its trading behavior, I first reconstruct a fund's long portfolios using 13F filings. I calculate the portfolio weight of the pitched stock before and after the pitch at quarterly frequency:
where q is the event time measured in quarters after the pitch, w ijq is the portfolio weight of the pitched stock i in fund j's portfolio in quarter q, SharesHeld ijq is the adjusted number of shares held by fund j, P jq is the adjusted price of stock j in quarter q, and the denominator is the total market value of fund j's 13F holdings in quarter q. Although many equity hedge funds run market-neutral portfolios or long-biased books, their long books usually represent a large chunk of their assets allocated to the strategies except for dedicated shorts-sellers. Therefore, a stock's portfolio weight in the long book proxies well for the level of conviction the fund has in the stock. 
Why Funds Pitch Stocks
The previous subsections show that funds do not hold onto their stock pitches any longer than to non-pitched stocks and that they start selling them soon after pitching them at the conferences.
However, at the same time, these pitched stocks do not su er negative risk-adjusted return after the pitches and are not necessarily bad stocks. In this subsection, I analyze the trade-o s funds face when choosing which stocks to pitch and test three possible motives for such behavior. First, funds want to take profit and pitch stocks with the most paper gains. Second, funds care about their reputation and pitching stocks at conferences helps them raise money. Third, funds want to create room in their portfolios for better investment opportunities and use conferences to create market demand and help decrease their top holdings.
First, I examine how hedge funds choose which stocks in their portfolios to pitch based on holdings and prior returns. Table 6 shows that the pitched stocks do not seem significantly di erent from the non-pitched stocks in the portfolio based on their factor tiles. The speaker lineups are usually confirmed and posted on the conference websites in advance of the conferences. However, the specific pitches are not known until the actual time of the speech at the conference. Therefore, the hedge fund that is pitching has some flexibility in the choice of stock pitches.
To analyze how a hedge fund chooses stock pitches at investment conferences, I look at the levels and changes of the holdings of portfolio stocks before the pitch and test their relationships with whether a given stock is pitched at the conference. Specifically, I regress the dummy variable
IsP itched on variables including holdings H i , change in holdings DH i and the returns of various
horizons R j separately:
where i and j indicate the hedge fund and the stock respectively, " refers to the number of quarters before the quarter in which the fund manager pitched at the conference; v refers to the number of trading days before the pitch date and R j,t≠vaet is the cumulative returns from t ≠ v and t for stock j. A stocks with a large position will have a large market impact if the hedge fund liquidates it. Given the ex-post action of hedge funds pitching stocks, this is consistent with the hypothesis that they want to drive market demand for the stocks that they want to liquidate. Although Column 2 reports that prior return does not predict the chance that a stock will be pitched, Column 3 suggests that funds pitch stocks to take profit. Column 3 reports the coe cient for the interaction term between the size of the holding and the past return. The positive and statistically significant estimate is consistent with the profit taking motive. A 10% larger paper gain means a stock is 2.24% more likely to be pitched. Column 4 suggests that higher portfolio holdings four quarters before the pitch positively predict that a stock within the portfolio will be pitched. Column 5 suggests that an increase in portfolio holdings from four quarters ago also positively predicts that a stock being will be pitched.
[ Table 8 about here.]
Hedge funds also rely on their good reputation to raise LP investment. This puts constraints on whether they can pitch bad stocks that they want to liquidate, because doing so will tarnish their reputation and credibility. As a result, funds still pitch stocks that they want to liquidate to drive market demand. However, they choose stocks with smaller upsides rather than outright bad stocks. To test this hypothesis, I collect fund raising activities from Form D filings and analyze how pitching stocks at investment conferences is related to fund raising outcomes. I regress the amount of money a fund raised on whether it pitched a stock in the prior year and how the pitched stock performed. Specifically, I run the following regression
where P ctMoneyRaised i,t+1 is the money raised as a percentage of assets by fund i in year t + 1, P itched it is a dummy variable indicating whether fund i pitches at an investment conference in year t, P itchRet it is the risk-adjusted returns of stocks pitched by fund i in year t, " t absorbs the year fixed e ects and v i absorbs the fund fixed e ects. -0 measures how much more money pitching a stock at a conference help raise. -1 measures how the performance of pitched stocks a ects fund raising. Table 9 reports the regression results for fund raising activities. Column 1 shows that pitching at investment conferences helps funds raise 3.4% more of their assets. This suggests that appearing at investment conferences helps promote awareness of funds and in turn helps their future fund raising. Columns 2 to 4 suggest that while a 1-month outperformance does not help fund raising, 3-month and 6-month outperformances help funds raise more money. Columns 5 to 7 suggests that the performances of non-pitched stocks with similar sizes do not have statistically significant e ects on the money raised. I control for position size because pitched stocks usually have larger portfolio weights and thus have larger impacts on portfolio returns. Column 8 is a placebo test. It shows that pitching at investment conferences does not help fund raising in the same year before the reputation e ect. However, this relationship might not be causal, because hidden factors can a ect a fund's decision to pitch and its future money raising abilities. For example, a fund manager might be experiencing a strong performance streak. The placebo test in Column 8 alleviates some of these concerns.
[ Table 9 about here.]
Another possible reason that a hedge fund may want to pitch a good stock but sell it afterwards is that it has better investment opportunities. Pitched stocks are good ideas but not the best ideas. The fund may want to decrease some holdings to build positions for its true best ideas. In fact, the pitched stocks usually have larger positions in the portfolios. To test this possibility, I
compare performances between newly-bought stocks after the conferences and pitched stocks. If newly-bought stocks perform better than the pitched stocks that the funds sell, this suggests that the funds face this security selection trade-o in their portfolios.
To test this hypothesis, I regress the post-pitch returns on dummy variables indicating whether a stock holding is increased after the pitch. To separate the doubling-down e ect, I further condition on the direction and magnitude of a passive change in holdings that is caused by stock price but not by active trading. Specifically, I run the following regression:
where P ostP itchRet ijt is the post-pitch return of stock j in fund i's portfolio when fund i pitches at a conference in time t, IsBuy is a dummy variable indicating whether fund i bought more stock j after the pitch and OtherN onP itched ijt is a catch-all dummy variables for the remaining non-pitched stocks in fund i's portfolios at time t. The base case is that a stock is pitched. X ijt is a dummy variable that further separates newly-bought non-pitched stocks. Table 10 reports the regression results on post-pitch returns. The first 3 months are excluded because newly-bought stocks are determined based on 13F holdings at quarter 0 and quarter 1.
Quarter 0 is the quarter in which the funds pitched the stocks at the conferences. Panel (a) shows that newly-bought stocks that have positive returns during the first 3 months after the pitches have 6.7% higher returns than pitched stocks from 3 months to 6 months after the pitches and 9.3% higher returns from 3 months to 12 months after the pitches. Both estimates are statistically significant. Doubled-down stocks-newly-bought stocks that have negative returns during the first 3 months after the pitches-have 1% higher returns than pitched stocks from 3 months and 6 months after the pitches and 1% lower returns from 3 months to 12 months after the pitches. Neither is, however, statistically significant. Other non-pitched stocks in the portfolio underperform relative to pitched stocks. Panel (b) shows that newly-bought stocks that have small absolute price changes have 4.5% higher returns from 3 months to 6 months after the pitches, but that the outperformance reverts afterwards.
Holdings by Other Investors
I analyze the trading behaviors of other investor groups based on 13F filings and FactSet Ownership data. I first aggregate stock holdings across funds for a certain investor category and calculate the holdings as a percentage of a stocks' shares outstanding. I separate institution investors that have active funds into hedge funds, mutual funds and other investment advisers. For hedge funds, I exclude the holdings by the funds that pitched. I then apply a similar event study method to calculate the cumulative change in holdings before and after the stock pitches for each investor category. I normalize the quarterly holdings relative to the quarter when the stock is pitched. Figure 8 plots the trading behaviors of institutional investors in pitched stocks before and after investment conferences. Di erent investors exhibit di erent behaviors, suggesting that they have di erent risk preferences and investment strategies. Other hedge funds exhibit trading patterns similar to those of the fund that pitched. This herding behavior suggests that they either run correlated strategies or share information with each other. However, other hedge funds continue to increase the portfolio weight of pitched stocks for another quarter after the pitches. It is plausible that they expect stock prices to go up temporarily after the pitches due to demand from unsophisticated investors. Investment advisers do not seem to pay attention to pitched stocks before the conferences.
However, they start buying the pitched stocks and hold onto them after the pitches.
More importantly, the mutual funds' behavior is the opposite to that of the hedge funds-their holdings decrease before the pitches but increase after the pitches. Because the majority of the outperformance of pitched stocks occurs before the pitch, mutual funds leave positive alphas on the Lastly, I analyze the trading behaviors of retail investors and corporate insiders. I approximate retail investors' holdings as the residual stock ownership after subtracting shares owned by institutions and insiders. I further adjust for short interests by adding them back to the shares outstanding and assume that the majority of the short positions are held by institution investors. That is a reasonable assumption because short selling is usually done by sophisticated investors. Retail holdings can then be calculated as Figure 9 plots the trading behaviors of retail investors and corporate insiders. First, retail investors are likely to be uninformed and to pay less attention to these industry events. They are likely to provide liquidity to institutions, both hedge funds and mutual funds. They miss outperformances both before and after the conferences. However, this result might be a ected by measurement errors on retail holdings. Second, corporate insiders show similar trading behaviors and consistently decrease their positions. However, they are less likely to be liquidity providers.
They have private information about companies and are more likely to engage in strategic actions to time stock sales.
[ Figure 9 about here.]
Conclusion
Using novel data on investment conferences, I examine the motives of hedge funds that pitch investment ideas at conferences and the market reaction to pitched stocks. Through event studies, I find that pitched stocks exhibit positive risk-adjusted returns both before and after the pitches.
However, the majority of the outperformance occurs before the pitches. Outperformance after the pitches, moreover, is likely driven by inflows from other investors that follow these investment conferences. In spite of outperformance after the pitches, I find that hedge funds do not hold on their pitched stocks any longer than to non-pitched stocks. They instead start to decrease the portfolio weight of the pitched stocks after the investment conferences and after they have earned most of the positive alphas of the pitched stocks.
In addition, I examine the trading behaviors of other investors around investment pitches. I separate stock ownership by investor categories including hedge funds, mutual funds and other investment advisors. One common pattern is that they all buy into pitched stocks after the conferences in the short term. However, their holdings patterns are fairly di erent at other time horizons. Other hedge funds behave similarly to the funds that pitch stocks-they buy before the pitches and sell afterwards. This suggests that hedge funds either run similar strategies or share investment ideas regularly. Mutual funds, however, trade the pitched stocks in a pattern opposite to that of hedge funds. They sell pitched stocks to hedge funds before the conferences when the pitched stocks earn significant positive alphas. After the conferences, the outperformance is smaller and they buy the pitched stock. The possible explanations for this opposite trading behaviors include passive liquidity provision and risk specialization.
Due to intensive competitions in the investment management industry, hedge funds are rapidly adopting new tactics to improve performance and generate alphas. I document an important new industry phenomenon and examine how hedge funds might strategically use it to their own advantage.
There are two potential directions for future research on the implications of these new tactics, which include using investment conferences, for market e ciency. First, as the sample size of the investment conferences expands, it is important to understand how other investors learn about the various new techniques employed by hedge funds. Do investors, over time, learn which conferences and hedge funds genuinely produce good pitches and which produce bad pitches? How do their reactions to these investment conferences change? The second direction for future work is better understanding the interaction between hedge funds and mutual funds. Does the opposite trading behavior of mutual funds occur because they are less attentive than hedge funds? Or does it occur because there are certain idiosyncratic risks that mutual funds do not want to bear? Mutual funds represent the bulk of the assets in the industry whereas hedge funds are more active in information production and price discovery. It is therefore important to investigate how the two players interact.
Figure 1: Short-Term Market Reaction to Pitched Stocks
This figure compares the cumulative average raw returns of pitched stocks (the blue line for long pitches and the red line for short pitches) to those of non-pitched stocks (black dashed line) and the market (black solid line) in a 10-day event window around the stock pitches. Day 0 is the event date when the fund pitched the stock. The cumulative returns are normalized to day -1. Non-pitched stocks include stocks held by the funds in the same quarter in which they pitched the stocks at conferences. The market return is calculated based on the value-weighted CRSP market index.
Figure 2: Trading Volumes of Pitched Stocks
This figure shows the average trading volumes of pitched stocks around the investment conferences. Day 0 is the event date when the funds pitched the stocks at the conferences. The daily trading volume is normalized by market capitalization and is calculated as SharesT raded/SharesOutstanding.
Figure 3: Market-Adjusted Returns of Pitched Stocks
This figure plots the long-term cumulative average market-adjusted returns for pitched stocks (the blue line for long pitches and the red line for short pitches) and non-pitched stocks (black line). The market-adjusted return is calculated as the excess return of a stock over the market return. Day 0 is the event date when the fund pitched the stock. The cumulative returns are normalized to day -1. Non-pitched stocks include stocks held by the funds in the same quarter in which they pitched the stocks at conferences.
Figure 4: Risk-Adjusted Returns of Pitched Stocks
These graphs show long-term cumulative average risk-adjusted returns for pitched stocks (blue line) and non-pitched stocks (black line). Panel (a) adjusts the returns using Fama-French 3 factors plus momentum and Panel (b) adjusts the returns using DGTW stock characteristics. Day 0 is the event date when the fund pitched the stock. The cumulative returns are normalized to day -1. Non-pitched stocks include stocks held by the funds in the same quarter in which they pitched the stocks at conferences. 
Figure 9: Trading Behaviors of Retail Investors and Corporate Insiders
This figure shows the cumulative average change in holdings by retail investors (red line), corporate insiders (green line) and institutions (blue line) in the pitched stocks. Quarter 0 is the quarter in which the funds pitched the stocks at the conferences. The retail holdings are approximated as the residual stock ownership after controlling for institutional ownership, corporate insiders and short interests. The change in holdings is calculated as the quarter-over-quarter change in the number of shares of a stock held by an investor group divided by the stock's adjusted number of shares outstanding. The cumulative change in holdings is normalized to quarter 0. This table reports the results of the daily Jensen's alpha test for the calendar-time portfolios using FamaFrench 3 factors and momentum. Column 1 reports the factor tilts and annualized alpha for a standalone long portfolio of pitched stocks, Column 2 for a standalone short portfolio of non-pitched stocks and Column 3 for the long-short portfolio. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses under coe cients. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) This table analyzes the factors that a ect a fund's decision about which stock to pitch. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock in a portfolio is pitched. P ortW gt is the portfolio weight of the pitched stocks in the quarter before the pitch and P ortW gt4QAgo is the portfolio weight 1 year before the pitch. ChgP ortW gt4QAgo is the change in the portfolio weight of the pitched stocks from 1 year before the pitch to the quarter before the pitch. P riorARet12M is the risk-adjusted return during the 1-year period before the pitch. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Pitched
(1) (2) (3) (4) This table analyzes how the performances of pitched and non-pitched stocks a ect funds' money raising activities. The dependent variable is the money raised in a year as a percentage of assets in the prior year. Columns 1 to 7 regress the money raised in the year after the pitches. Column 8 is the placebo test and regresses the money raised in the same year as the pitches. P itched is a dummy variable indicating whether a stock is pitched. The next three variables are risk-adjusted returns for the pitched stocks 1 month, 3 months and 6 months after the pitches. The last three variables are for the non-pitched stocks. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
